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THE CRIMES OF CRIME LABS
J. HerbieDiFonzo*
If you put God on the witness stand... and God's testimony conflicted
with the DNA evidence,
everyone would automatically say, "Why is
1
God lying like this?"

I.

INTRODUCTION

In November 2005, a man was convicted in New York City for a
thirty-two-year-old rape. The circumstances were quite unusual, even for
cold cases. The original 1974 trial had ended in a hung jury, and the
defendant had jumped bail before his scheduled re-trial. He was
apprehended in 2004 in Georgia on another charge, and a background
check disclosed the open New York warrant. The crucial difference
between the 1974 and 2005 trials was DNA evidence recovered from the
underpants which the victim wore on the day of the crime, "found
'2
stuffed in the files in the Manhattan district attorney's cold case unit.

* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. This essay extends ideas I first
expressed in an earlier article, In Praise of Statutes of Limitations in Sex Offense Cases, 41 HOUS. L.
REV. 1205 (2004), and elaborated in my Hofstra University Distinguished Faculty Lecture, "The
Surprising Unreliability of DNA Evidence: A Tale of Bad Labs and Good Statutes of Limitations,"
delivered October 19, 2005. Many thanks to my research assistant, Stephanie Restifo.
1. Laura LaFay, Reasonable Doubt, STYLE WEEKLY, July 6, 2001;. 'available at
http://www.styleweekly.com/article.asp?idarticle= 10614 (quoting defense attorney David Baugh).
2. See Julia Preston, After 3 Decades, Guilty Verdict in Rape Case, With Help From DNA,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 2005, at B I. The victim has never been able to identify her attacker, since he
had pulled a sheet over her and she never saw his face.
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Unimaginable a generation ago, DNA evidence now virtually
guarantees a conviction in a sex offense case. DNA forensic procedures
have attained the courtroom air of flawlessness, often referred to as the
"mystical spell" of DNA. DNA is heroic truth. It is the forensic
equivalent of divine intervention, with its Herculean capacity to free the
falsely convicted and-just as importantly-to demonstrate that no
malefactor can escape justice, no matter how long it takes. In her closing
argument in the 2005 rape case, the Assistant District Attorney told the
jury that the DNA profile recovered from the victim's underwear and
that of the defendant were "identical in every way." Then she clinched
her point: "Yankee Stadium could be filled with 50,000 people once a
day for 54,000 years and there would not be another person who would
match [the rapist's] profile." The prosecutor stressed to the jury that, by
contrast to the "total domination" by the assailant during the brutal
attack, now it was the victim's "turn to hold the power-her turn,
because DNA works." 3

II.

DNA AND THE "CSI EFFECT"

DNA does, indeed, work. Theoretically, forensic DNA analysis of a
thirty-two year old semen sample should be just as accurate as
examination of bodily fluid from a rape kit collected the day before. But
DNA's capacity to survive the ravages of time attests only to the
durability of genetic identity. It provides no affirmation that the DNA in
question has been adequately gathered, examined, and maintained, nor
whether testimony regarding DNA will be truthful or accurate. DNA's
reputation for scientific precision is in fact unwarranted. The record is
littered with slapdash forensic analyses often performed by untrained,
underpaid, overworked forensic technicians operating in crime labs
whose workings reflect gross incompetence or rampant corruption.
Why does this matter? It matters because the average jury is not
exposed to the track record of forensic science in the courtroom. The
jury foreman in the 2005 rape trial expressed the common wisdom:
"Everybody agreed that the DNA evidence was so strong ... [t]hat's
why everybody voted guilty in this case.", 4 The scientific basis of DNA
testing can mislead the unsuspecting into believing that the introduction
of DNA evidence in court not only ensures procedural regularity, but
also washes away the need to examine any corroborating or
contradictory evidence. One prime example of the cultural sway of DNA
3. Id.
4. Id.
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is seen in the "CSI Effect," popularly defined as "the perception of the
near-infallibility of forensic science in response to the TV show.",5 CSI.
Crime Scene Investigation and its forensic cousins have led juries to
worship forensic testimony. Prosecutors and defense attorneys have
begun to voir dire potential jurors on their CSI viewing habits. In the
world portrayed on CSI, forensic technicians are always above reproach:
"You never see a case where the sample is degraded
or the lab work is
6
faulty or the test results don't solve the crime.",
But how carefully is DNA analyzed and preserved in real labs, in
cases not dreamed up by screenwriters? DNA matching is regarded as
well-nigh infallible, so long as the sometimes microscopic quantity of
DNA is handled with the utmost care in order to achieve its vaunted
accuracy in identification. But "DNA samples recovered from crime
scenes are often so small and in such disintegrated condition that they
are easy to mishandle or manipulate." 7 In fact, the criminal justice
system "does a poor job of distinguishing unassailably powerful DNA
evidence from weak, misleading DNA evidence."8 A recent Chicago
Tribune examination of 200 DNA and death row exoneration cases since
1986 found that more than a quarter involved faulty crime lab work or
testimony. 9 As forensic expert William C. Thompson has concluded:
"The amazing thing is how many screw-ups they have for a technique
that they go into court and say is infallible."10
One explanation for this unsatisfactory track record may be found
in the generally poor training and minimal educational requirements of
forensic analysts. The lack of certification or license requirements in the
profession has also been cited to explain the often shoddy performance
of forensic laboratories. The laboratory accreditation process remains
voluntary in most states. Out of more than 1000 local, county and state

5.

Paul Rincon, CSI Shows Give 'Unrealistic View', BBC NEWS, Feb. 21, 2005, availableat

http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/sci/techV4284335.stm (quoting forensics expert Max Houck).
6.
2004,

at

Richard Willing, 'CSI Effect' Has Juries Wanting More Evidence, USA TODAY, Aug. 5,
IA, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-08-05-csi-effect-x.htm

(quoting forensics expert Dan Krane).
7. Ryan McDonald, Juries and Crime Labs: Correcting the Weak Links in the DNA Chain,
24 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 356-57 (1998).
8. William C. Thompson et al., Evaluating Forensic DNA Evidence: Essential Elements of a
Competent
Defense
Review,
CHAMPION,
Apr.
2003,
at
I,
available
at

http://www.cs.wright.edu/itriUEVENTS/SUMMER-INST-2003/SIAC03-Krane2.pdf.
9. See Maurice Possley et al., Scandal Touches Even Elite Labs: Flawed Work, Resistance to
Scrutiny Seen Across U.S., CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2004, at C 1.

10. Ruth Teichroeb, Rare Look Inside State Crime Labs Reveals Recurring DNA Test
Problems,

SEATTLE

POST-INTELLIGENCER,

July

22,

2004,

at

Al,

available

at

http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/183007_crimelab22.html.
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crime labs nationally, only 294 have been accredited with the American
Society of Crime Laboratory Directors as of 2005.1 Nor are forensic
evaluators subject to any regulatory body to set standards and oversee
quality performance.
Foremost among the many validation measures available to forensic
laboratories is the retesting of genetic samples to avoid both false
positives and erroneous exclusions. The opportunity to retest a DNA
sample is considered one of the guarantees against a false charge
involving genetic proof. To ensure the reliability of DNA analysis,
scientific protocols call for splitting a sample before testing, whenever
possible, so that the analysis may be replicated by another forensic
examiner. Yet some crime labs use up all the genetic
material in testing
2
so that the opportunity for re-testing is destroyed.'
Each day, more genetic samples from rape kits are collected and
deposited into state laboratories, while lack of funding has put the states
behind in processing the hundreds of thousands of samples they already
have. The pressure of high DNA backlogs accentuates the normal job
bias affecting many forensic analysts. Lack of independence is cited as a
major problem affecting the majority of crime labs, which are run by
police departments. Technicians who work in such labs can come to see
themselves not as neutral fact-finders, but as "police in lab coats. ' ' 13 This
pro-prosecution bias is evident at every stage of the forensic process.
Evidentiary material is often presented to the police analyst in a
11. See AM. SOC. OF CRIME LAB. DIRS., LAB. ACCREDITATION BD., LABORATORIES
ACCREDITED BY ASCLD/LAB, http://www.ascld-lab.org/legacy/aslablegacylaboratories.html (last
visited Nov. 22, 2005); Press Release, S.F. Police Dep't, SFPD Crime Lab Receives Accreditation
(Sept. 6, 2005), availableat http://www.sfgov.org/site/police index.asp?id=34258.
12. See, e.g., James Herbie DiFonzo, In Praise of Statutes of Limitations in Sex Offense
Cases, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1205, 1248-49 (2004) (describing the practice of the Houston Crime Lab).

Whether due to lack of awareness, resources, or for some unknown combination of reasons, "less
than 1% of court cases involving DNA are reviewed by experts working on behalf of the defense."
Introduction, FORENSIC BIOINFORMATICS, http://www.bioforensics.com/Frames/intro.html (last
visited Nov. 20, 2005).
13.

Editorial, Testing Questions; HPD Crime Lab Measures Not Instilling Confidence, HOUS.

CHRON., Feb. 4, 2003, at A40; see also Thompson et al., supra note 8, at 4 (noting the problems
when forensic scientists refuse to take appropriate steps to 'blind' themselves to the government's
expected (or desired) outcome when interpreting test results). Thompson and his co-authors
uncovered many instances in which forensic analysts were "acutely aware of which results will help
or hurt the prosecution team." Id. One example: In a case where the defense lawyer had suggested
that another individual besides the defendant had been involved in the crime, and might have left
DNA, the DNA laboratory notes include the notation: "Death penalty case. Need to eliminate [other
individual] as a possible suspect." Id. (alteration in original). Another example: When her
interpretation of genetic data was challenged, one analyst defended her position by saying: "I know
I am right-they found the victim's purse in [the defendant's] apartment." Id. (alteration in
original).
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suggestive manner, accompanied by police memos indicating the
rationale for suspecting the guilt of a particular suspect.
In a previous article, I described the Houston, Texas Crime Lab and
the manner through which its serious deficiencies led to the erroneous
rape conviction of Josiah Sutton.14 Forensic testimony presented by the
prosecution in that case "proved" that the probability of a coincident
match was 1 in 694,000 African-American males. In fact, subsequent
testing by an independent private laboratory showed that the probability
of a match exceeded 1 in 8 African-American males. Worse, the Crime
Lab failed to present DNA evidence which should have excluded Sutton
as one of the rapists. The Houston Crime Lab has been shut down since
December 2002 as a result of the scandal over this and other troubling
cases.
In 1997, Paul C. Giannelli noted that "major abuses in the use of
scientific evidence have surfaced, including perjury by expert witnesses,
faked laboratory reports, and testimony based on unproven
techniques."' 15 Since that time, the accounts of crime lab abuses have
proliferated, involving potentially hundreds of cases. 16 To illustrate the
scope and range of the problems, the following is a tiny sampling of
recent (2003-2005) documented crime lab errors:
FBI Lab-DNA: A technician failed to follow proper procedures for
two years, omitting quality-control checks designed to prevent foreign
material from contaminating lab samples. This violation of testing
protocols cast doubt on the accuracy of the results. FBI lab officials
notified prosecutors, outside labs, and others involved in the relevant
cases, to allow them the opportunity to retest and challenge the FBI's
analysis and conclusions. In May 2004, FBI analyst Jacqueline Blake
pleaded guilty to a criminal charge of making false statements
regarding her failure to follow protocols in approximately 100 DNA

14. See DiFonzo, supra note 12, at 1242-54.
15. Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for
Independent Crime Laboratories,4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 439, 441 (1997).

16. See generally Possley et al., supra note 9 (reporting on evidence of problems ranging
from negligence to outright deception uncovered in recent years at crime labs in at least seventeen
states); Ellen Perlman, Overwhelmed by a Flood of DNA Evidence, Public Crime Labs Are
Performing
Poorly,
GOVERNING
MAG.,
Apr.
2004,
available
at

http://bioforensics.com/news/governing_4-04.html (describing "serious errors" in many crime labs);
Robert Tanner, Crime Labs Placed Under a Microscope: Miscues Lead to Calls for Changes in

Forensic Labs, WASH. POST, July 27, 2003, at A5 (discussing recent forensic mishaps and wrongful
convictions attributable to crime labs or suspect forensic science).
17. See John Solomon, FBI's DNA Lab Subject of Probe, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 29, 2003, at
Al 2; Richard Willing, Mueller Defends Crime Lab After Questionable DNA Tests, USA TODAY,

May 1, 2003, at 3A.
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analyses. The Inspector General concluded that "Blake's misconduct,
and the Laboratory's failure to detect it for a period exceeding two
' 18
years, has damaged intangibly the credibility of the FBI Laboratory."
FBI Lab-Fingerprints: As a result of a fingerprint match which an FBI
affidavit determined was a "100 percent positive identification,"
attorney Brandon Mayfield was arrested in connection with the Madrid
terrorist bombings in 2004. After two weeks in prison, Mayfield was
released
when the FBI admitted that their fingerprint laboratory had
19
erred.
St. Paul, MN: Out of 350 recent cases, twenty-five DNA samples were
contaminated with a lab worker's or another person's DNA. In seven
of those cases the DNA sample was switched from one person's case
a contamination rate of two percent, or one
to another. That represents
2
out of every fifty cases. 0
Seattle, WA: Forensic scientists contaminated tests or made other
mistakes while handling DNA evidence in at least twenty-three cases
involving major crimes over the last three years. Forensic scientists
tainted tests with their own DNA in eight of the twenty-three cases.
They made mistakes in six others, from throwing out evidence swabs
to misreading results, identifying the wrong rape suspect. Tests were
contaminated by DNA from unrelated cases in21three examinations, and
between evidence in the same case in another.
Virginia Division of Forensic Science: The scientific audit report by
the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors (ASCLD) found
numerous errors in the analysis and interpretation of DNA evidence in
the case of Earl Washington, a man who came within days of
execution in Virginia for a crime he did not commit. What the auditors
found when they studied these DNA reports was that the Virginia
Division of Forensic Science (DFS) had misinterpreted their results
and improperly excluded another man, a convicted sex-offender who
18. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., THE FBI DNA LABORATORY:
A REVIEW OF PROTOCOL AND PRACTICE VULNERABILITIES iii (2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0405/final.pdf.
19. See David Feige, Printing Problems: The Inexact Science of FingerprintAnalysis, SLATE,
May 27, 2004, http://www.truthinjustice.org/fingerprint-error.htm; FBI Apologizes to Lawyer Held
in Madrid Bombings, MSNBC.cOM, May 25, 2004, http://msnbc.msn.com/ID/5053007/.
20. David Chanen, Defense Attorneys Raise Concerns About DNA Sample Mix-up,
1B, available at http://www.lawMay 20, 2005, at
STAR TRIB.,
MINNEAPOLIS
forensic.co/minnlab 05_01.htm; BCA Crime Lab Under the Microscope, KSTP.COM, May 20,
2005, availableat http://www.kstp.com/article/stories/S8367.html?cat=l.
21. Teichroeb, supra note 10.
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may be the true killer. The auditors also identified numerous deviations
from the lab's own protocol, possible contamination in early tests,
inconsistent
results, and conclusions that were not scientifically
22
sound.
III.

WHY STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS STILL MATTER
IN THE AGE OF DNA

With the 2005 rape case in mind, New York County District
Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau has called for New York to join the
groundswell of states ending or significantly extending statutes of
limitations: since DNA is perfect, limitations periods are obsolete.23

Why do we have statutes of limitations in criminal cases? The primary
reasons for restrictions of time revolve around universally accepted
notions that prompt investigation and prosecution insure that any
conviction is reliable, and not the product of uncertain memory or ersatz
evidence. Reasonably fresh proof is deemed more trustworthy than older
evidence possibly corroded by time. Time fades recollection, witnesses
die, and documentation vanishes. Evidence rebutting assertions of
criminal conduct often becomes a casualty of the clock. However,
Morgenthau referred to the defendant in the 2005 case as "the poster
child for abolishing the statute of limitations-he was identified with
DNA that was over 30 years old. People's memories may fade over
time-DNA does not." 24
But the premise of that argument is quite wrong. DNA is only
perfect in theory. In the real world, DNA analyses are subject to the
same forces of incompetence and inveiglement as any other evidentiary
process. We have become enraptured by DNA, and are thus blind to
what we know is true in all other corners of our lives. Human folly can
pervade even scientific evidence. In fact, because the algorithms of
forensic analysis are so removed from our quotidian existence, we
become credulous at the very moment when skepticism is most needed.
We understand, on an abstract basis, that there is no dispute over the
scientific validity of DNA testing. But we then give credence to an
22. James Dao, Lab's Errors in '82 Killing Force Review of Virginia DNA Cases, N.Y.
TtMES, May 6, 2005, at Al.

23. See DiFonzo, supra note 12, at 1217-26 (describing the movement in the states to erase or
markedly extend limitations periods in sex offense cases).
24. News Release, District Attorney, New York County (Apr. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.manhattanda.org/whatsnew/press/2005-04-28.htm. Note that the statute of limitations
did not bar the 2005 rape conviction, since it was tolled during the many years the defendant was a
fugitive.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1

evidentiary conclusion in a specific case without reflecting on the
potential for errors in the undertaking. If we were to concede that DNA
always and unmistakably identifies the rapist, then there would indeed
be no entries on the other side of the ledger: no concern for cloudy
memories or cavalier proof; no acknowledgment of the need to bestir the
human and technical apparatus of the State to act expeditiously in
apprehending and prosecuting evildoers; and, finally, no sense that
limitations periods help assure accuracy in the criminal justice system.
But, as case after case has shown, forensic testing and testimony are as
prone to error as is any human endeavor. The record is larded with
instances of contaminated samples, mislabeled vials, rushed and
inaccurate analyses, and outright perjury.
In our gritty criminal justice system, forensic testing is not
conducted in the impeccable, prototypical laboratory of a major research
institution. Nor does the analyst operate on the crystalline set of CS!.
More typical is the Detroit Crime Lab. Here is a description: Housed in a
former elementary school, the lab suffers from power surges and
brownouts stemming from its irregular power source. The freezers to
preserve DNA evidence and rape kits are completely full, but the
building lacks the electrical capacity to add appliances. Bright yellow
police tape cordons off a quarter of the chemistry lab because water
leaks have lifted the linoleum tiles and made the floor unsafe. There is
no vault to store evidence that has been processed for fingerprints.
Shotguns and automatic rifles are stuffed into shopping carts for storage;
inside the walk-in freezer for the DNA samples and rape kits, evidence
bags are stacked on the floor. Plastic milk crates and cardboard boxes
hold hundreds of manila envelopes marked with fluorescent tags.
outside because
Materials used for the bomb disposal unit must be stored
25
the crime lab does not have an indoor storage area.
The Houston Crime Lab is arguably worse.2 6 An independent audit
in 2002 exposed widespread problems: "Analysts botched simple tests.
They misinterpreted data. They stored evidence in a room where the
ceiling leaked so badly that, one stormy night, 34 DNA samples were
destroyed. ' '27 Although internal audits of the crime lab were mandatory,

25. See David Josar, Space Crunch Hampers Lab Work: Evidence is Stacked in Boxes,
Freezer is Full as Detroit's Technicians Attempt to Analyze Data, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 21, 2005, at
8C, available at http://www.detnews.com/2005/metro/0504/21/CO8-1 57208.htm.

26. See DiFonzo, supra note 12, at 1242-49 (describing the Houston Crime Lab). All
quotations in the text below are drawn from sources cited in that article.
27.

See DiFonzo, supra note 12, at 1243.
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they "have not been performed in the last several years. 28 Houston's
District Attorney, who was responsible for presenting the forensic
testimony from the DNA lab, admitted that he knew that the lab had
"been hiring people for years... who have no [DNA] training., 29 City
Councilwoman Carol Alvarado described the conditions she observed in
touring the facility in June, 2002: "These were not just leaks; these were
holes .... There were trash buckets and water buckets throughout the
lab. They were having to move tables around, because some of the leaks
were near and sometimes above where the analysis was occurring., 30 A
photograph published in the Houston Chronicle showed the inside of the
Houston crime lab on a rainy day: "Ceiling tiles missing. A wastebasket
in the middle of the floor to catch a leak.
A yellow barricade to warn
31
people so they won't slip on the floor.
The conditions in which DNA and other forensic testing actually
occurs in the United States thus call for extreme caution before
evidentiary free passes are afforded the resulting analyses, particularly
when many years have passed and the opportunity to cross-examine the
forensic examiner has long since passed away. In short, while statutes of
limitations may be repealed, neither the laws of human nature nor
recurrent budgetary shortfalls are so readily altered or remedied.
IV.

PROPOSED LEGAL REFORMS AND ACCREDITATION

REQUIREMENTS
The current disconnect between the public perception of DNA and
the reality of forensic testing prompts me to suggest certain reforms:
1. Retain Reasonable Statutes of Limitations
The traditional rationales for statutes of limitations continue to
supply persuasive evidence for caution before shifting the balance
between the state and the individual. Especially in the age of DNA, the
risk of an erroneous verdict is great and is generally related to the
endemic human factors of evidentiary mismanagement and mendacious
28. Id. at 1244 (quoting Steve McVicker & Roma Khanna, Crime Lab Chief Reveals Failings:
In Internal Papers,DirectorDescribed Ongoing Problems, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 2, 2003, at Al 7).

29. Id. at 1244 n.225 (quoting Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker, Bradford Knew of DNA Lab
Problem: DA Denies Claim He, Too, Was Aware of Poor Conditions, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 26,
2003, at Al).
30. Id. at 1247 (quoting Karin Brulliard, Tex. Lawmakers Probe Lab Over Reports of Tainted
DNA Evidence, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2003, at A5).

31. Id. (quoting Thom Marshall, Leaky Crime Lab is Tip of Iceberg, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 28,
2003, at A31).
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witnesses. Ascertaining the perfect balance among the extraordinarily
public policy concerns in sexual offense cases is an impossible task. But
the goal should be to allow prosecutions in a timely-and thus not
unlimited-manner, in order to minimize the risk of erroneous
convictions.
2.

Require Accreditationfor Labs and Certificationfor Analysts

The experiment of voluntary accreditation and haphazard analyst
certification has failed. As a baseline proposition, states and the federal
government should hold forensic science to professional standards. DNA
samples should be processed exclusively in nationally-accredited
laboratories, whose certification procedures, employee training and
evaluation records, and laboratory error rates are made public.32
3.

Condition the Admissibility of DNA Evidence Upon the Preservation
of Enough DNA Sample to Allow for an Independent Re-test

Replication is at the heart of science. In DNA testing, this means
that the laboratory must retain a portion of the evidence sample in order
to allow for re-testing. 33 Given the experience with negligent or
intentional violation of this standard, an exclusionary rule is appropriate
as a prophylactic measure to ensure compliance with this critical
component.
4.

Remove Crime Labsfrom the Authority of the Prosecutor
and the Police

The pro-prosecution bias of forensic examiners has been repeatedly
documented. It seems unlikely to end until law enforcement no longer
32. These certification standards have existed since 1998 and are nationally recognized if not
enforced. They are known as the DNA Advisory Board Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic
DNA Testing Laboratories, and are available at http://www.cstl.nist.gov/div831/strbase/dabqas.htm
(last visited Nov. 21, 2005). They detail standards on issues such as a quality assurance program,
laboratory organization and management, forensic examiner certification, an evidence control
system to ensure the integrity of physical evidence, DNA sample quality validation, forensic
analytical procedures, equipment calibration and maintenance, procedures for taking and
maintaining case notes to support the conclusions drawn in laboratory reports, administrative and
technical reviews, proficiency testing, corrective action, audits, and environmental health and safety
programs.
33. Such a requirement is not unknown. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-3-1(c.1) (2005)
(requiring that "a sufficient portion of the physical evidence tested for DNA [be] preserved and
available for testing by the accused"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 152(C)(2)(b) (West 2005)
(requiring that "physical evidence [be] collected and preserved that is capable of being tested to
obtain a profile from deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)").
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employs and supervises the same forensic examiners from whom society
expects complete neutrality and fealty only to scientific norms. Crime
labs today are an arm of law enforcement, funded with criminal justice
dollars, and often physically located in police buildings. But this linkage
to law enforcement is the very one which taints the evidence. In order to
remove this attachment, we will have to decide whether DNA matching
and other forensic procedures are truly scientific, and thus objectively
neutral, or are tools of the law enforcement team, and pressured to
achieve results suitable for the prosecution. I propose that DNA testing
be segregated from the adversary system. Public crime labs should be
funded and administered independently from the police and prosecutor,
and forensic analysts and lab directors should not be subject to review by
law enforcement personnel. Further, defense attorneys should have
access to DNA testing on the same basis as the prosecution. Only in this
way will the crime labs achieve independence, and with it the freedom to
engage in true science.
V.

CONCLUSION

I make these proposals in an effort to spark a badly needed dialogue
with scholars, forensic scientists, law enforcement personnel, defense
attorneys, judges, and legislators. My recommendations will doubtlessly
require clarification, even modification; they may well arouse
opposition. But if we are to stop our deadly dalliance with DNA, and
instead aim at asserting proper legal authority over the actual practice of
forensic science, we should begin by taking the issue more seriously
than we have in the past. Only then will we be able finally and honestly
to trust DNA.
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